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There are numerous determinants of closeness in relationships between people. Cognitive
representations of others in one’s own mind are considered especially meaningful (Cooley, 1902;
Durkheim, 1953; Markus and Moya, 2010). In particular, openness to others depends on the types
of mental links between the Self and Others, leading to the formation of the WE concept.
The WE concept has specific affective and behavioral components. Some studies have
demonstrated it in a spectacular way. Brewer and Gardner (1996) found that the number of
instances of the word “we” used in neutral texts correlated with the lower or higher degree of
further conformist reactions in participants who read given text. The simple “we” label (used in
neutral context), associated in the mind with social context, stimulated behavior oriented toward
social expectations.
The WE concept connects people, but at the same time can be the basis for powerful barriers
and, sometimes, hostility. Empirical findings have shown the significance of theWE–THEYmental
differentiation. Using the minimal group paradigm, psychologists demonstrated that even artificial
groups (identified based on trivial criteria) displayed differentiation of in-group vs. out-group
attitudes, especially evident in-group favoritism (Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1981,
1982). Even preschool children display out-group discrimination (Bar-Tal, 1996). In our studies
(Jarymowicz, 2004), similarly to adults, the 9–10 years old participants displayed the IAT effect
(Greenwald et al., 1998), connecting Pols rather with “flowers” and Germen rather with “insects.”
However, people are able to develop mental representations in such a way as to be able to separate
cognitive differentiation from evaluative discrimination.
SOCIAL BELONGING AND SOCIAL CATEGORIZATIONS
The desire for interpersonal attachment and the need to belong are considered basic determinants
for human attitudes and choices (Schachter, 1959; Baumaister and Leary, 1995). However, it
should be emphasized that social belonging concerns two different types of human communities
(Tajfel, 1981) which should not be confused. As individuals, we belong to social groups vs. social
categories—small communities with real, direct contacts, common goals, and actions, and to large
categories (teachers, women, or Europeans), in which majority of members are linked “only”
conceptually.
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The first type of belonging, rooted in face-to-face interaction,
leads to strong identification with in-group members, bolstered
by material and psychological interdependence. The second type
refers to larger social categories in whichmajority of members are
reciprocally unknown. Identification is based on the mental links
between the Self and Others and a feeling of belonging, which
lead to positive attitudes (even toward those who as individuals
would stimulate antipathy). The WE concept is constructed in
opposition to THEY. Social psychologists paid a lot of attention
to the fact that such WE—THEY opposition automatically led to
social categorizations and discrimination (Billig and Tajfel, 1973;
Fiske and Neuberg, 1989; Abrams and Hogg, 1999; Kwiatkowska,
1999; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2006).
Social categories (as a reference point for the need for identity
gratification) often have blurred boundaries, and frequently
cannot be easily distinguished from one another. The result is
uncertainty and the need to determine who does and who does
not belong to the WE category (who is a “true” Pole, German
or Jew). Consequently, the perception of the WE homogeneity
and WE–THEY difference is often significantly overestimated
(Suls and Miller, 1977; Snyder and Fromkin, 1980; Fiske and
Neuberg, 1989; Brewer, 1993). Moreover, THEY are identified
based on oversimplified stereotypes and prejudices (Allport and
Kramer, 1946; Campbell, 1967), often associated with negative
emotions (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982). In extreme cases, such
factors raise fundamental obstacles to the so-called intractable
conflicts resolution (Bar-Tal, 2013).
BEYOND SOCIAL BELONGING: COMMON
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES AND MORAL
VALUES AS THE BASIS OF THE WE
CONCEPT
As social beings, we associate the WE concepts mainly with
our belonging to social groups and categories. However, we are
able to develop other types of WE concepts through conscious
consideration of ourselves and others. These reflections can
proceed by social comparisons or by comparing the “real” self
and others to abstract (ideal) evaluative standards.
Within interpersonal comparisons we may find similarities
with members of different social categories in terms of particular
personal attributes. The WE can be referred to people (of
different sex, age, race or nationality) who—as myself—“are
involved in defending human rights” or “enjoy techno-music.”
Social identity can be bridge across diverse social categories,
based on interpersonal similarities.
Additionally, the Self can be connected with Others in
abstract ways: by reference to ideal standards and moral concepts
(Reykowski, 1979; Higgins, 1987; Jarymowicz, 2012; Jarymowicz
and Szuster, 2014; Jarymowicz and Imbir, 2015). In this case, a
mental encounter between the SELF and the OTHER can lead to
a new type of the WE concept, namely to the formula of “WE as
people,” brought together by the realization that all people form a
universal community.
With that reasoning in mind (Jarymowicz, 1998, 2008), we
identified four types of WE concepts (associated with different
forms of social identity): (1) WE as a group of individuals
(the group identity), (2) WE as a social category of people
(the categorial identity), (3) WE as people of different social
backgrounds, with common attributes (the attributive identity),
(4) WE as human beings (the axiological identity).
Three of the above categories (attributive identity included)
are associated with conditional acceptance of OTHERS: they are
accepted if they belong to the same social group or category, or
if they have some personal attributes (traits, attitudes or aims)
similar to one’s own. Only the axiological identity can be result
from unconditional acceptance of others.
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE
RELEVANCE OF THE WE TYPES
DIFFERENTIATION
In empirical studies we used the Questionnaire of Social
Perception (Jarymowicz, 1994) to distinguish subjects with
different types of the WE concept. In response to the open
question “Who are the people I call WE?,” participants are asked
to enumerate as many answers as they would like to. These
answers are scored by the experimental team, and participants
are assigned to groups with different dominant WE concept
type—based on the proportion of a given type of answers. In
this procedure there are almost no answers related to universal
WE concept. Thus, we usually compared three “WE groups”: (1)
WGR:WE as a group (answers like “Myself and my family,” “Our
basketball team”), (2) WCT: WE as a category (e.g., “We, nurses,”
“We, Poles”), (3)WAT:WE as people with similar attributes (e.g.,
“We, optimists,” “We, environmentalists”). In some other studies
(Grzesiak-Feldman, 2006; Jarymowicz, 2006), the different types
of WE were stimulated through experimental manipulation:
participants read one of several short texts in which an unknown
individual presented his/her social identifications. Pointed out
were such sentences as: in WGR conditions “I spend a lot of
time with my school friends. We go out every weekend . . . ,” in
the WCT conditions “For me, the most important thing is to
maintain relations with people of my profession. I read journals
edited by our association. . . ,” and inWAT conditions “I feel close
to people who are nonconformist, empathetic, optimistic. When
I travel in Poland or abroad, I am drawn toward such people . . . .”
In all studies we compared the above groups and conditions with
regard to their attitudes toward strangers.
In the studies of Kwiatkowska (1999), participants were
requested to estimate the usefulness of faces in guessing strangers’
social belonging (like nationality, religion). As predicted,
such estimations of importance of physical attributes were
significantly higher among the WCT than among the WGR
participants. This result is consistent with the assumption that
categorial identity prompts social categorizations even if their
basis is ambiguous, unsound, vague, and trivial (Fiske and
Neuberg, 1989). It does not concern such a social identity
form which is clearly related to a particular group membership:
related to the WE as a group. In some studies we used implicit
and explicit stimuli denoting different nationalities, and indirect
attitudes measures. Data confirmed our predictions: participants
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with attributive identity displayed significantly more favorable
attitudes toward strangers than those in the remaining categories
(Szuster, 2005). In a long series of studies Grzesiak-Feldman
(2006) found that belief in conspiracy theory (Jewish conspiracy)
was significantly more prevalent in WCT condition (“WE as a
social category”) than in the WGR one (“WE as a group”), but
even more so compared with WAT conditions (“WE as people of
similar preferences, hobbies, or interests”).
In the framework of our studies on the axiological identity we
realized that this stage of the development of social identifications
is much more difficult to achieve. The concept refers to certain
intellectual capacities which we consider crucial for developing
a sense of community among people across diverse cultures.
Of those skills, understanding of abstract concepts associated
with moral values seems especially important. With such
psychological foundation it is possible, for example, to defend
human rights even of those whom we perceive as intellectually or
ethically inferior. To recognize some axiological predispositions
we pay attention to the measurements of the so-called axiological
complexity, which permit a subject to find out a meaning of
abstract concepts like honesty, loyalty or tolerance, and so-called
axiological emotionality, related to affective components of such
concepts which influence probability of development of personal
standards based on such superior values (Jarymowicz, 2010).
In empirical studies we describe the axiological complexity
in terms of a number of real life referents one is able to list
(regardless of their validity which can’t be precisely assessed),
simply as a measure of the one’s readiness for moral reflection.
Thus, we ask participants to generate (as many as possible)
manifestations of justice, righteousness, humanism (etc.). To
measure the axiological emotionality, we use the classic version
of the Osgood’s semantic differential (Osgood et al., 1957):
participants have to confront abstract concepts like tolerance
or liberty with words related to sensual pleasure/displeasure
(like sweet–bitter, or hard–soft). The primary results show
(Jarymowicz, 2010, 2012; Karwowska and Kobylinska, 2014) that
the higher the number of indicated values referents and degree
of positivity of affective components of axiological concepts,
the lower the influence of implicit affective priming, the lower
acceptance of anti-axiological social norms (like death penalty),
and the higher indices of favorable attitudes toward social
minorities.
CONCLUSIONS
Empirical findings seem to support important claims and
assumptions. (1) The concept “WE as a group” has a solid base in
a given community and a real experience in the course of direct
contacts, thus to maintain own identity any cognitive biases nor
simplified stereotypes of the outgroup members are not needed.
(2) The concept “WE as a social category” has to be carefully
distinguished from the previous one, since the successful search
of one’s own social identity needs the “intergroup” (properly:
intercategorial) cognitive and evaluative discrimination. (3) The
attributive WE concept can be developed regardless of social
belonging, as a consequence of cross-categorial, interpersonal
perception of common personal traits—leading to feeling of
community even with the “out-group” members. (4) The concept
“WE as people, as human beings” (related to so-called axiological
identity) can be developed through the reflective references
of the Self and the Others to abstract moral values, which
make possible to accept others regardless of their social status,
and (in some conditions) lead to emotional identification with
strangers.
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